


Nuclear Safety in Europe The German perspective 28 June 2011

G. Hennenhöfer

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
Overview

1. Policy decisions and legislation in Germany

- Euratom-Directive on nuclear safety transposition
- Response Fukushima: milestones and legislation towards phase-out


2. Achievements and assessments - German perspective

- Global nuclear safety and security framework major European impact
- Lessons learned from the enlargement process common ground and perspective for nuclear safety in Europe
- Implementation of WENRA Reference Levels the German experience
- Safety Reviews: German review and EU Stresstests need for harmonized approaches




Directive 2009/71/Euratom (Safety Directive) Transposition of into German law

- Safety Directive constitutes a legally binding basis for cooperation within the European Union
- National responsibility for nuclear safety
- Germany: obligations resulting from the Directive were in parts covered by existing national provisions
- Entire transposition by means of the 12th amendment to the German Atomic Energy Act; entry into force: 27 December 2010



German response to the nuclear accident in Japan

- Social and political reassessment of risks adherent to the use of nuclear energy
- Political decisions of 15 March 2011:
 - safety review of German NPPs
 - shut down of seven oldest NPPs during threemonth moratorium



The work of two commissions

Reactor Safety Commission (RSK)

- → Task: review of plants with respect to their behaviour in the event of impacts beyond the design basis and upon postulated unavailablilities of safety system
- → Conclusion: high levels of robustness of NPPs

Ethics Commission "Safe Energy Supply"


- → Purpose: reaching a social consensus
- → Opinion: nuclear phase-out possible within one decade




13th amendment to the German Atomic Energy Act (draft)

- End of use of nuclear energy for the commercial generation of electricity in Germany by 31 December 2022
- Successive permanent shut down of NPPs
- → Challenge for licence holders and regulatory bodies: maintaining a high level of nuclear safety for the time of operation







Global Nuclear Safety and Security Regime

- Lead role by EU Member States and Commission
 - Nuclear conventions
 - Strengthening and regular updating of IAEA safety standards
 - Missions and services such as IRRS, OSARTS
- Common ground for today's EU framework and practices
- Need for Commission initiative for strengthening EU safety competence and lead role in a joint effort with Member States




Lessons learned from the European Enlargement Process

- Challenge: Common Position on "high level of nuclear safety" in the European context
- No European Standards available
- Report by AQG and WPNS based on WENRA experience in 2001
 - Based on the instruments of the Global Regime
 - Common understanding also with new members
- Firm ground for EU framework and creation of ENSREG
- Proposal: Establishment of an European Agency for Nuclear Safety




WENRA Reference Levels German Situation

Regulations



Implementation



Assessment in 2006 90 RL not adequately regulated




Assessment in 2010 No consensus

Assessment in 2006 28 RL not adequately implementated




Assessment in 2010
Nearly all RL implemented with tolerable differences



WENRA Reference Levels Implementation in Germany

- Safety Management and Organisation
- Design and Extension of design
- Accident Management
- Safety analysis report and safety documentation
- Periodic safety reviews, in particular probabilistic safety reviews



RSK Safety Review Issues addressed

- Natural hazards: Seismic and Flooding
- Postulated events: SBO, LOOP (long lasting >72h), Loss of Service Water
- Precautionary Measures: Internal flooding in different Areas, Failure of high-energy-lines, Failure or drop of large component
- Aggravating boundary conditions to perform AM measures
- Man-made hazards: Airplane crash, Blast pressure waves, burnable and toxic gases, impact from neighboring unit, terroristic attacks, cyber attacks



RSK Safety Review Four level approach


Categorization

Definition of a base-level:


- current licensing base
- including preventive and mitigative accident management
 Definition of three levels of robustness,
- the higher the level the higher the robustness
- definition is topic-specific

Example Flooding:

- Base level: Design flood (10.000 yearly flooding)
- Level 1: Some reserves compared to base level (e.g. river flow increased by factor 1.5)
- Level 2: Higher reserves compared to level 1 (e.g. river flow increased by factor 2)
- Level 3: Loss of vital function under condition of level 2 can be excluded



RSK Safety Review Typical findings



Some assessments are preliminary, needing further demonstration


Plants

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Summary

- Immediate cessation of operation of eight plants and phase-out of the remaining nine plants within one decade
- Continued improvement of safety in Europe by strengthening the legal framework in Europe and through cooperation within ENSREG and WENRA
- Commission initiative for revitalizing scientific technical cooperation of experts from regulatory bodies and TSOs in particular for safety cooperation with third countries
- Harmonised approaches for EU stresstests by optimal use of national safety review experience
- Establishment of a European Agency for Nuclear Safety by Members
 States and Commission based on national TSOs and JRC



Nuclear Safety in Europe The German perspective

Thank you very much for your attention!